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The recent growth and apparent successes of the Islamic State and its apparent eclipse of 
al─Qa’ida have caused much concern around the world and have been the subject of much 
debate and discussion. Unfortunately, much of such debate and discussion is of limited val-
ue as it sees these organisations as separate, which they are as structures, rather than dif-
ferent particular manifestations of the same larger phenomena： the development of Is-
lamism and Islamic fundamentalism.
This paper seeks inform such debate and discussion by presenting an ethnographic study 
illustrating to present a study of how local structures articulate with global circumstances 
to create recognisable outcomes on the ground：particularly the growth of Islamism（un-
derstood as a political project）and Islamic fundamentalism（understood as a religious proj-
ect to return society and its members to posited original or correct teachings and practic-
es of Islam）．In this I show how political, social, and intellectual leadership by Islamists 
and Islamic fundamentalists is possible even when the success and standing of secular 
groups is great and their standing high, given appropriate structures and conditions. I aim 
to show how relations between secular and religious structures can change, how one or 
the other can become dominant, and thus how that dominance can change
I have argued elsewhere（Kaim 1997, 1998, 2003a, 2003b, 2004, 2005）that if we are to un-
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2derstand the social and cultural implications of the integration of the whole planet into a 
single global system we must study the local level. This is the level at which action takes 
place, and it is through action that structure is connected to circumstance. The presentation 
is heavily ethnographic rather than theoretical. However, it follows the theoretical points 
outlined elsewhere（Kaim 1997, 1998, 2003a, 2003b, 2004, 2013, 2014, 2015）．It also builds on 
and extends the discussion of antecedent developments set out in Kaim（2005）．As in that 
earlier study this article is concerned with the village of Tustas（not the village’s real 
name）， which is a Palestinian village on the West Bank, situated in the Judean hills over-
looking the Palestinian plain. It is a mixed Christian and Muslim village with a total popu-
lation of approximately 1,000, about two thirds of which is Christian and one third Muslim. 
In particular I look at the development of Islamism and its relation to cultural logics.
The dangers of homogenising history and the limitations it places on our understanding 
are well illustrated by the surprise engendered by the growth of Islamism on the West 
Bank and the changes it has wrought on Palestinian national politics. The first Palestinian 
uprising（1987─1991）was important in this too. It was during that first intifada that the 
shape of the underlying Israeli ─Palestinian conflict began to change, with changes particu-
larly among Palestinians1. Until the uprising began there was no serious challenge from 
among Palestinians to the position of the Palestine Liberation Organisation（PLO）as the 
sole, legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. Since then, however, we find seri-
ous divisions between the PLO and Islamic militants, culminating on the de facto division 
of the West Bank and Gaza Strip between two Palestinian‘Authorities’, one PLO and the 
other Hamas. Difficult as it may be to believe now, in the early years of the uprising many 
commentators believed that Islamist forces could not effectively challenge the secular na-
tionalists such as the PLO for leadership of the movement against the Israelis. For exam-
ple, even prominent experts such as Marshall（1989）and Taraki（1990）both argued this.
As the case of Tustas shows, however, political, social, and intellectual leadership by Is-
lamists was possible even in the early days of the uprising when the success of the PLO and 
associated secular groups was greatest and their standing highest. Moreover, it is not only 
possible in Tustas but also more generally, given appropriate structures and conditions. This 
has in fact been borne out by the growth of the Muslim Brotherhood（MB）─Hamas’ influence 
and strength in the territories, where Hamas has become the largest political movement after 
Fatah and is seen as the only movement capable of challenging Fatah’s political dominance.
1　Of course, there were also changes among Israelis but I shall not discuss them in any 
detail here.
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The basic political fact in Tustas is that secular nationalists are exclusively Christian and 
religious nationalists are wholly Muslim. Christians overwhelmingly support the secular 
nationalist organisations of the PLO while Muslims support the MB─Hamas. More gener-
ally in the Palestinian national movement Muslims make up a significant proportion of the 
secular nationalists, though once again they constitute virtually all of the religious. Howev-
er, the unchallenged dominance of the Muslim Brothers among Tustas’s Muslims is inter-
esting in three respects. It allows us to understand relations between secular and religious 
politics and thus how one or the other can become dominant. It allows us to understand 
how that dominance can change. It also allows us to understand the social basis for one or 
the other’s growth and influence2.
The structures of Tustasi society are important in explaining the dominance of the MB and 
Hamas. But there is a further point. Professional politicians understand that “all politics is 
local”and that those who forget this maxim will finally fall; unfortunately many social sci-
entists are yet to understand the implications of this for their research. Often political con-
flicts and movements are analysed from the top down. General or national events, organ-
isations, and activities are analysed and it is assumed that what occurs on the local level 
reflects these more general occurrences. However, study and understanding of the local 
level is crucial to understanding the national level. In an important sense national politics 
is a collection of many local politics. The national situation develops out of local activities 
and the efforts of local activists. It is the local significance of events that is the key to un-
derstanding why they have occurred and what they mean for higher levels. Despite this, 
however, study of the local level beyond the results of ballots is all too rare, partly because 
most social sciences are not well equipped to study local events and determine their local 
significance. But understanding of local developments and significance allows the discussion 
of complex issues which are often difficult to comprehend and to follow, not in the abstract, 
but in terms of the actual circumstances in which action takes place. This gives a deeper 
and clearer understanding of events and developments, their significance, and why they 
2　Also, on a less abstract level, until recent years such overwhelming support for Islamists 
was unusual on the West Bank（as distinct from the Gaza Strip）．The general reasons for the 
greater strength of Islamism in the Gaza Strip than on the West Bank have been argued to 
be the former’s more traditional social structure, greater isolation, and more extreme poverty
（see, for example, Roy 1995）．However, others such as Hammami（1997）have argued that 
rather than differences in traditional social structure or religious history Palestine Islamism 
offered a model of society and social behaviour particularly relevant in the face of the effects 
of Gaza’s particular integration into the Israeli economy.
4occur in the way they do. The structures that explain the dominance of the MB─Hamas 
in Tustas are the same structures which influence the articulation of the wider Palestinian 
national politics on this local level. This, then, is a realisation of Edward Said’s call for a non─
homogenising history, but one derived from my approach and its imperatives, not his; indeed, 
it illustrates by way of contrast my proposition （see Kaim 1997, 1998, 2003a, 2003b, 2004, 
2013, 2014, 2015） that his approach paradoxically inhibits that which it is supposed to enable.
Religion and National Politics：opposition and competition
Not surprisingly for a political movement, Islamism is expressed in very different ways 
from one country to another, within a given state（Legrain 1990：175）and between differ-
ent organisations in a state3. The Palestinian Islamic movement is not simply an extension 
of, for example, the Iranian revolution, though some members may claim that as a model. 
The most important fact that Palestinians have had to face, unlike their comrades else-
where, is the exceptional strength of nationalist ideologies among Palestinians generally 
and the absence of a Palestinian state structure.
In other countries Islamist groups have commonly sought state power as a prelude to‘re
─Islamising’ society. Initially, Palestinian Islamists of the Muslim Brothers aimed to reso-
cialise the whole of society along Islamic lines through religious education, in order to cre-
ate the preconditions for their desired Islamic order rather than to actively seize power
（Taraki 1989：173; Legrain 1990：175）．State power was to be sought after the national 
liberation of Palestine. In this, religious ideologies were subordinated to the powerful na-
tionalism of the Palestinian movement. However, the intifada caused the MB to change its 
position on the priority of resocialisation over the seizure of state power. The liberation of 
Palestine came to be seen as the most urgent task because as long as the occupation con-
tinues Islamisation is not possible. The MB thus became a national Islamic group rather 
than the pan─Islamic group it had been.
3　Related to this Tripp（1996）provides an interesting analysis of the dynamic operating 
between various logics of the state in the Middle East, the use of Islamic themes by Middle 
Eastern states, and oppositional Islamist movements.  Further background on the nuances 
of similarities and differences between different Islamist movements may be found in 
Sidahmed and Ehteshami（1996）， and Beinin and Stork（1997）．Abu─Amr（1994）examines 
differing Islamisms in Palestine, namely the MB and Islamic Jihād, particularly looking at 
their origins, development, their differences and the relationship between them, and their 
political─religious orientations.
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Despite the‘nationalisation’of most Palestinian Islamists, disunity between them and the 
secular nationalists is a serious problem for the Palestinian national movement. Generally, 
in both the religious and secular camps, unity is recognised as one of the most effective 
weapons against Israel and neither is willing as yet to abandon it. There is, however, op-
position and competition between the secular nationalists and Islamists. In spite of their 
being able to form a broad front of alliances there have been many disagreements, rival-
ries, and occasional physical confrontations between groups of the two camps. From the 
late 1970s on Islamism rose due to the apparent success of the Iranian revolution and set─
backs suffered by the PLO especially after its expulsion from Lebanon in 1982（Marshall 
1989; Satloff 1989）．However, when the first Palestinian uprising began, the Muslim Broth-
ers were faced with marginalisation and made a serious effort to establish an alternative 
current in the uprising. Hamas was created as an attempt to overcome this marginalisa-
tion by translating into daily and political practice the radicalism of MB discourse on the 
liberation of Palestine. Initially, Hamas appeared quite separate from the Palestinian na-
tionalist movement. In particular, both nationally and in Tustas, Hamas asserted its influ-
ence at the expense of the secular PLO bodies and the United national Leadership of the 
Uprising（UNLU）， and presented itself as an alternative leadership of the uprising while 
denying it was doing so. However, Hamas in particular rose to a new prominence through 
the uprising. It promoted campaigns for boycotts of Israeli goods, tax payments, licensing, 
and called strikes in direct competition with those of the PLO─UNLU. Activists in Tustas 
enforced these strongly, using direct violence against villagers and their property if the 
villagers did not observe Hamas directives. They especially targeted shopkeepers who did 
not observe the boycotts and strikes called by Hamas. Violence against people ranged 
from threats to severe beatings; attacks on property were most commonly achieved 
through setting fire to the shops and houses of those who followed PLO directives but not 
those of Hamas. In one particularly dangerous case the only shop in the village selling bot-
tled gas（on which the whole village relies, there being no mains gas）was set on fire early 
one morning. The only thing that prevented a huge explosion was a routine Israeli army 
patrol seeing the fire and putting it out.
Hamas later reached accommodation with the Palestinian nationalist movement, though 
profound political differences remain. Rejection of the peace process and continued calls 
for the liberation of Palestine, the destruction of Israel, and the establishment of an Islamic 
state have seen Hamas resort to violence in direct opposition to the interests of the nation-
alists as represented by the PLO, presenting the national movement with a real crisis. For 
6their part the Islamists believe that the PLO’s efforts will founder and that the people will 
be left with no alternative but Islam. If they are to take leadership at that time they must 
participate in the anti─ Israeli struggle now.
More directly, the relation of Israel to Islamist groups raised questions about those groups 
in the minds of many Palestinian nationalists. Israel sponsored such groups, particularly 
the Muslim Brothers, and acquiesced in their rise in order to challenge the nationalists
（Satloff 1989; Graham─Brown 1984）．Israel also attempted to present the Islamist move-
ment in general as a serious challenge to the national movement and Hamas in particular 
as an alternative to the PLO（Taraki 1990）．Not surprisingly, many nationalists believed 
that Hamas was incited or encouraged by the Israeli intelligence services to sow discord 
and disunity among Palestinians.
Religion and national politics locally
The complete allegiance of Tustas’s Muslims to the MB and Hamas（and their willingness 
to express that allegiance）makes sense in terms of the structures and dispositions of the 
village’s two communities. As a challenge to the secular policies of the PLO─UNLU associ-
ated with the Christians, support for the MB─Hamas plays on the wider opposition in Pal-
estinian politics described above. The stress of the MB─Hamas on Islamic morality is also 
appropriate as a method of promoting communal unity and orthodoxy in opposition to the 
manifest heterodoxy of the Christians.
Religious affiliation is important both in terms of identifications made in the village itself 
and in the wider context of the Israeli ─Palestinian conflict. It is true that while religious 
affiliation has an obvious role in identification among Palestinians, that role is primarily one 
of differentiation and distinction and as such does not lend itself to the national political 
mobilisation of the population as a whole. In fact, attempts to mobilise people along reli-
gious lines would be divisive, as the PLO’s secular policy admits. The majority of politically 
active Christian youth in Tustas use global or international（and non─religious）discourses 
such as those of communism and secular nationalism to express their political desires and 
to stake their claims. Young Tustasi Muslims, however, use and express themselves in re-
ligious or semi─religious terms such as using interpretations of verses from the Qur’an to 
predict the inevitable destruction of the State of Israel by Muslims, and arguing that a 
holy war（jihād）is necessary. Such terms exclude non─Muslims and are a source of con-
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stant concern among Christians, who see them as threatening their position as a minority 
within the struggling Palestinian population as well as threatening the secular stance and 
campaigns of the PLO. They also cause concern about whether there will be a place for 
Christian Palestinians in any future independent Palestinian state, because Hamas’goal is 
the liberation of Palestine to allow the establishment of an Islamic state and society. In-
deed in Hamas’ charter Islam is required to be central to all Palestinian national efforts. 
The charter also says that there is no solution to the Palestinian problem except jihād and 
that Palestine is an Islamic land so that no portion may be ceded to non─Muslims（Journal 
of Palestine Studies 1993）．
There has been a development of interest in Islam among Tustasi Muslims since the late 
1970s, the same period over which interconfessional visiting has declined. Leading mem-
bers of the Muslim Brothers in the village say that this has come about through disillu-
sionment with the USA, Europe, the former USSR, and even the UN as well as ideologies 
such as secularism, nationalism, socialism, and communism. According to Amin, a teacher 
at the government school and the leading Muslim Brother in the village,
in the past the people trusted the West, the USA and Europe, to help them in their 
struggle with the Jews［sic］， but without benefit. The British gave the land to the 
Jews and from 1948 until the present day there has been no further progress. Some 
people turned to communism but the USSR did not give any real assistance either. 
The Middle East merely became a market for arms and an arena in which the rival-
ries of NATO and the Warsaw Pact could be played out. The Palestinians even trust-
ed the UN and especially the five permanent members of the Security Council, but to 
no avail. For all their talk of human rights none was realised here. The people had thus 
tried all the available roads except one. That which had not been tried was Islam. Thus, 
in the past ten years the people have begun to return to their religion［i. e. , Islam］．
This “return to religion”and the rise of fundamentalism or a religious politics among the 
Muslims has been a source of real concern for the Christians. They fear that if the more 
extreme Islamist elements gain influence once a Palestinian state is established the Chris-
tians’ position will be at best unenviable and at worst they will be exterminated as a 
group. A story circulated in the village saying that shortly after the intifada began Mus-
lims in mainly Christian Bait Jalla（near Bethlehem）had gone from house to house telling 
Christians“you must convert, you must convert. We don’t need any Christians here.” The 
8threat contained in the story is that a fully Palestinian state will have no place for Chris-
tian Palestinians and that just as the Israelis will have been driven out so will Christians. 
The Christians of Tustas feel acutely any Muslim accusations that their Christianity some-
how reduces their commitment to Palestine or to fight for Palestinian liberation, or that it 
gives them a‘special’ relationship with the Israelis, as they were accused of after an at-
tack on the village by Israeli settlers（Kaim 2013）， for example. Interestingly, however, al-
though this story was told with passion in the Christian community, it was often accompa-
nied by the comment that “our Muslims”（i. e. , Tustas’ Muslims）are fine and good, 
contrasting harmonious relations within the village with problems outside it. Privately, 
Christian villagers admitted that if an Islamic state was established in Palestine “there 
would be many problems for the Christians and we should be able to do nothing to protect 
ourselves because we are a minority.” At the same time they publicly denied any deep dif-
ferences between Christian and Muslim Palestinians by referring to common history, cus-
toms, life, and even nationality（“we are all Palestinians”）．In this avowal of historical, cus-
tomary, existential, and national commonality with Muslim Palestinians the Christians do 
two things. Firstly, they invoke a local dogma of harmony and unity in the village in con-
trast to the outside. Secondly, they deny that their religion is a threat to the unity of the 
wider national movement, which is dominated by Muslims（as is the Palestinian population 
at large4）．
The fears of the Christians are summed up in the phrase “after Saturday comes Sunday”， 
which circulates widely through the Christian community. There are a number of stories 
accounting for its origin, but they all share common characteristics：non─Tustasi Muslims 
met in a centre of Christian population outside the village, usually Bethlehem or Jerusa-
lem, to decide what to do after the Six Day War, which they thought they would win, and 
decided that once the Israelis were driven out Christians would have to be as well, giving 
birth to the phrase, Saturday being the Jewish holy day and Sunday the Christian holy 
day. For example, Abu Faraj, told me that that it originated
at the time of the Six Day War. When my sister was living in Bethlehem Muslims met 
in a house to decide what they would do when they won（as they thought they would）
and said,‘After Saturday comes Sunday,’meaning, of course, that once the Israelis 
were vanquished it would be our turn.
4　While the great majority of Palestinians are（Sunni）Muslim approximately 7 percent are 
Christian, and a further 2 per cent are Druze.
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In this story too the threat to Christians is displaced outside Tustas and its community to 
Bethlehem, so maintaining the village dogma of interconfessional harmony.
Tustasi Muslims strongly deny any harassment by Muslims of Christians to convert or 
that there would be no place for Christians in Palestine after the Israelis had been ex-
pelled. In the words of Jawad, a young Muslim in his late twenties and an enthusiastic sup-
porter of Hamas, “the people who say such things and harass Christians are not true Mus-
lims and are not supporters of Palestine. They are people who want to cause disturbances 
and strife among the people and thus weaken the struggle. ” Here again unity in the na-
tional struggle is paramount and religious differentiation is seen as weakening that unity.
Thus there is a denial on both sides of the religious divide of conflict both between the 
confessions and in the village as such, leading to statements that “relations between all the 
families are good,”or that there have never been Christian─Muslim conflicts, per se, in 
the village. The recurrence of an idea of a lack of differentiation（especially economic dif-
ferentiation）in the village contributes to a strong sense of commonality among the villag-
ers. This is reinforced by the also frequently mentioned sharing of customs between all 
groups in the village. Members of both confessions subscribe to this evocation of common-
ality based on the absence of confessional strife, the sharing of customs, and, a further fea-
ture, the common experience of difficult circumstances such as hunger and hardship.
The idea that there have never been outright Christian─Muslim disputes in the village, to-
gether with ideas of shared historical experience and customs, are very important for the 
identifications made by members of both confessions. They are local elements important 
especially in establishing village identity. More than this, however, these local elements 
also feed into and support claims for a common national identity and politics not threat-
ened by religious divisions. Global5 elements are also used by Tustasis, especially in wider 
contexts than that of the village and its community, for example, in developing notions of
5　My distinction between ‘local’ and ‘global’ terms, elements, or discourses should not be 
taken to imply any dichotomy or ontological separation of the two any more than authors 
using such terms as ‘great’ and ‘little’ traditions are guilty of developing such rigid 
structures.  Such labels are, rather, merely heuristic tools designed to express and ease 
understanding of the fact that social actors make use, in continuo, of terms, elements, and 
discourses of wider or narrower relevance and of greater or lesser exclusivity. Rather than 
trying to make a rigid distinction between the two the use of these terms indicates an 
awareness of such continuity.
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‘Palestinian─ness’as a nationality.
On the national level both Muslims and Christians see oppression by the Israelis as com-
mon to all sectors of Palestinian society without discrimination. This is seen as outweigh-
ing religious differences and making such differences irrelevant for the purposes of the na-
tional struggle. It is argued that all Palestinians are united by sharing the experience of 
dispossession and oppression by the Israelis. It is also emphasised that any divisions 
among Palestinians themselves threaten the continuation and success of the struggle itself. 
Religious terms of identification are a particular problem because of their divisive poten-
tial. On both the national and the local levels of Palestinian politics they must be subordi-
nated to‘shared historical experience’in order to overcome that divisiveness. Given this 
necessity of the subordination of religious differences the local struggle for dominance in 
Tustas between the Christian secular nationalists and Islamists presents a particularly se-
rious political and social problem which must be overcome. This is achieved through the 
dogma of inter─religious harmony and unity referred to above.
This dogma of intra─village harmony is given extra force by presenting the harmony not 
only as a feature distinguishing the village from other present ─day Palestinians, but by 
saying that it has always been so, throughout history, thus making it appear a natural, un-
changing, and unquestionable fact of village life. This is done by referring to a division of 
the village into two groups formerly found across Palestine：the qais and yaman.
This division does not operate today, but existed until recently, becoming redundant in the 
nineteenth century and the early part of this century. Until that time, power and political 
activities throughout Palestine were based in families and extensive alliances and affilia-
tions were built up over wide areas6. The division into qais and yaman was the most ex-
tensive of these systems of the political affiliations of families.
Because power and politics at that time were based in kinship structures and relations po-
6　Indeed, Muslih（1988）has located the origins of Palestinian nationalism in the politics of 
Palestinian notable families and their enhanced economic, social, and political status and 
power as a result of Ottoman reforms from the middle of the nineteenth century, European 
economic penetration, and economic expansion. Additionally, Khalaf（1991）has implicated 
the continuation of pervasive factionalism based on kin cleavages and links into the 
twentieth century in the collapse of Palestinian society in 1948. On the connection between 
factionalism and class structures see Tamari（1982）．
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litical relations were expressed using kinship terms. The names qais and yaman derive 
from two ancient tribes of Arabia of which yaman is regarded as the older and qais the 
younger（Patai 1962：183） The people saw themselves as descendants of the ancient tribes 
which bore these names7. Alliances such as those expressed through these terms were 
necessary historically as the state was weak and inter─ factional warfare was common 
throughout Palestine（Johnson 1982; Owen 1981; Hoexter 1973）．The strengthening of the 
state under the Ottomans and British reduced the need for these alliances8 to ensure local 
security, and economic changes similarly made them unnecessary for economic relations. 
Today kinship relations are irrelevant to the economic activities of the individual labouring 
for wages, while the fact that the parties of the Palestinian national movement have fully 
national reach means that they are irrelevant to macro─ level political organisation also.
Throughout the Middle East the division of recognised groups, communities, or areas into 
two parts or factions was common. Groups belonging to different sects or even religions 
were often part of the same faction and, conversely, members of the same sect or faith 
were divided between both factions; similarly, where there were politically significant kin 
divisions they were commonly cut across by qais─yaman affiliation（Patai 1962：180）（see 
diagram 1, below）．
Faction C
Sect/Religion A Sect/Religion B䊻 䊹䊺 䊺䊼 䊼䊻 䊹
Faction D
Diagram 1
General Middle Eastern alliance configuration
In Tustas, religious links were undermined, but kin links were not. The Ghazal were allied 
with dar Ishaq, while the Faras were allied with the Wazir and Nabulsi（see diagram 2, 
below）．Because whole clans were contained in either qais or yaman the alliance system 
7　On the cultural context in which claims of kinship were used to legitimate political claims, 
schisms and violence see also Hoexter（1973）．
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in no way undermined the locally significant kin divisions; rather it incorporated them 
without division. On the other hand, by dividing the two Muslim clans from each other 
and the two Christian clans from each other and allying one of each religion with one of 
the other religion, the system did undermine the significance of religious affiliation for po-
litical purposes.
Dar 䊻 The
Ishaq 䊹 Ghazal䊺䊺 䊼䊼
The Wazir 䊻 The
The Nabulsi 䊹 Faras
Diagram 2
Cross-cutting alliance system in Tustas
Both Muslim and Christian villagers see this division as the basis on which they have had 
peaceful relations throughout their history of cohabitation, in contrast to the surrounding 
villages, Palestine as a whole, and the world in general. Historically, as soon as any dispute 
or conflict between individuals or groups of the two different religions arose in the village 
the system of cross─cutting alliances would come into play, preventing Muslims from be-
ing pitted against Christians and vice versa. By this very fact, such disputes were not 
8　Political warfare among Palestinians gradually lost its effectiveness under the British as 
the state structure was strengthened. After 1967 and until recently it was particularly 
circumscribed owing to the effective system of control imposed by Israel and the fact that 
any widespread violence would invite the intervention of the Israeli authorities. Israeli 
occupation, recognised as an external threat, also provided a focus for solidarity contributing 
to the limitation of intra ─Palestinian political violence. It is not surprising, then, that 
Tustasis（as Palestinians more generally）saw advantages in limiting conflicts among 
themselves.  The profound violence perpetrated among Palestinians during the intifada and 
afterwards by groups such as the Red Eagles was a real departure from the previous 
situation.  To the extent that the intifada itself was a limitation of Israeli control by 
Palestinians it opened a space for the activities of such vigilante groups. Now, of course, the 
PLO and Hamas’s security forces are accused of oppressive brutality, though this is violence 
by the ‘state’ against its people, rather than political warfare among Palestinians.
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Muslim─Christian conflicts per se. This has created a tradition of religious harmony with-
in the village because there are no examples that villagers can draw on of conflicts be-
tween the two religions. This tradition of harmony in turn constrains political activists to-
day by making Muslim─Christian conflicts seem unnatural and alien to the village. Thus 
the current importance of the qais─yaman system of alliances does not lie in its continua-
tion to the present day. Rather, despite the fact that it is no longer operative, or indeed 
because it is not, it is used to support the notion that relations between Christians and 
Muslims in the village are, and always have been, peaceful and harmonious. It is important 
as a rhetoric because it produces an overt local politics in which the terms‘Muslim’and
‘Christian’are not salient. Through this the struggle between the secularists and religious 
activists is made covert, defusing current tensions in, and disguising, the Christian─Mus-
lim struggle for dominance in the village and making it less threatening to the unity of the 
national effort to oust the Israelis.
In the nineteenth century the qais ─yaman opposition was used to legitimise political 
struggles in kin terms. Today it is used to disguise religio─political contests. This differ-
ence relates to the transformed nature of the circumstances in which Palestinians now 
find themselves. As we have already discussed the Palestinian confrontation with Israel is 
nationalist. Palestinians have made national unity central to their struggle. Religious divi-
sions are a threat to that unity and so cannot be accepted as legitimate without placing 
the national struggle in jeopardy by undercutting the dominant political opposition of‘Pal-
estinian’and‘Israeli’. Rendering the terms‘Christian’and‘Muslim’insignificant in local 
politics resonates with the wider national politics, and preserves the‘national’nature of 
the local effort. This is useful for the Muslims supporting Hamas in view of misgivings and 
suspicions in the wider Palestinian population about Hamas’loyalty to the national move-
ment. However as we saw earlier, the Christians cannot afford to have their loyalty to the 
national effort openly challenged either. Thus, it is in the interests of both groups that they 
not be seen as working against the national movement. In the nineteenth century the qais
─yaman opposition created patterns of alignments in which inter─regional or village dis-
putes would not disrupt the solidarity of the village9. Today, the idea of the qais─yaman 
opposition serves a similar purpose of preserving village solidarity in the contemporary, 
different context of domination by a strong state.
9　See also Tamari（1982）．
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Local relations between religious and political divisions
Even though the religious idiom is not appropriate or available for general or interconfes-
sional mobilisation religious divisions affect political activities in Tustas. For about one 
month after an attack on the village by Israeli settlers（Kaim 2013）， activities associated 
with the uprising were drastically curtailed, and even when they were resumed they did 
not reach the same level as before the attack. It was the opposition of Hamas which pre-
vented a resumption of political action. The basis of that opposition was Hamas’opposition 
to the secular nationalism of the PLO and associated groups and its demands for a reli-
gious and Islamic state. This caused difficulties in co─ordinating action between the PLO 
and Hamas generally, and in Tustas also.
The total dominance of the MB─Hamas among Tustas’ Muslims and the political adher-
ence of the Christians to the PLO poses great problems of co─ordination and has turned 
the village into a scene of contest between the two camps for dominance and for the op-
portunity to project the successful one’s political campaign.
In the struggle for dominance in the village the Christians of Tustas are at a disadvantage 
in that their political, kin, and religious divisions inhibit organisation. In such a situation 
seemingly minor questions can have great political importance and cause passionate argu-
ment. This occurred at the funeral of the villagers killed in the settlers’attack. Muslim ac-
tivists demanded that the bodies be wrapped in Palestinian flags and that nationalist em-
blems and symbols be incorporated into their funeral and subsequent memorial service. 
Nationalist activists opposed these demands. Elsewhere such questions are not problemat-
ic and would have been done as a matter of course, but in Tustas became highly charged 
issues. They were significant because while the emblems and symbols were nationalist the 
villagers who died were not nationalists but Islamists. Thus, if the nationalist emblems and 
symbols were used they would honour Islamist activists who did not work for the secular 
Palestinian state that those symbols and emblems represent, but for a religious, pan─Is-
lamic state and order. The use of the symbols would allow the Islamists to strengthen 
their claim to represent Palestinian nationalism and would compromise the secularists’po-
sition, through the PLO, as the sole legitimate representatives of that nationalism. Recogni-
tion of the Islamists’claim would threaten the Christians’place in the national movement 
and threaten the position of secularism on the national political agenda, and could see secu-
larism and the Christians weakened and made peripheral, perhaps paving the way for 
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their defeat and removal or oppression.
Christian Tustasis’self─consciousness as a fragmented religious minority and their inter-
ests as such explain their alliance with the heterodox and secular PLO. However, while 
the secularism of the PLO promises to protect their long term interests by separating reli-
gion and politics, the factional nature of the PLO accentuates rather than reduces their po-
litical divisions.
An important factor in the fragmentation of the Christians, apart from the religious and 
kinship factors that I have already referred to, are the socio─economic developments where 
the increased economic independence of the individual undermines not only the ties of the 
individual to his relatives, but because communal ties are also traditionally expressed 
through kin connections, serves to undermine the ties binding the community together also.
Of course, the Muslims of Tustas are subject to the same socio─economic developments 
and forces which are undermining communal ties among the Christians. Unlike the Chris-
tians, however, they are united and resist the fragmenting influences of those forces. Their 
kinship affiliations provide one way to express unity, and their religion another, neither of 
which are viable in this role for the Christians. In both these idioms（the kin and the reli-
gious）the Muslims can not only express and reinforce unity but they can do so in opposi-
tion to the Christians and their fragmentation, which further reinforces that unity and 
turns it into a mark of their distinctiveness as Muslims.
However, Hamas similarly provides a political structure and idiom which allows the Mus-
lims not only to express and reinforce unity but to do so in opposition to the Christians. 
Through the imperative of maintaining religious unity, pressure is brought to bear through 
Hamas for political unity in a way and to a degree that secular political parties such as 
those in the PLO cannot achieve, because of the deeper root of religion in the individual’s 
socialisation from childhood. Adherence to Hamas in the political arena therefore comple-
ments the kin and religious factors keeping the Muslims united. Hamas is a single organ-
isation, provides one orthodox view of politics and what needs to be done and does not ad-
mit any alternative views, is religious, and is explicitly opposed to the PLO and parties 
associated with the peace process. Thus, in all three socially important areas—politics, kin-
ship, and religion—the Muslims enjoy structures that allow them to express, practise, and 
even enforce, unity, and to deny any political, religious, or kin alternatives. In contrast, the 
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political organisations supported by the Christians are varied, often opposed to each other, 
express a heterodox variety of political creeds and ideologies, and are secular. Thus, in all 
three areas—politics, kinship, and religion—the Christians lack any structures to express, 
practise, or enforce unity. It is not surprising therefore that the Christians have fallen vic-
tim to the individualising and fragmenting influence of socio─economic developments.
Of course, religion must be of practical use in political understanding or mobilisation if it is 
to play a political role at all. This comes from a number of sources. Through its base in 
the individual in socialisation from childhood, religion becomes an integral part of the indi-
vidual’s self─ identity and understanding. It also provides an expressive vocabulary and se-
ries of images, concepts, and allusions through which past religious leaders, events, and 
struggles can be used to provide emotive parallels with, and paradigms for understanding, 
the present. In Islam categories of conflict and struggle, particularly those of shahīd（mar-
tyr）， and jihād（holy war）， are especially powerful because of their importance as part of 
the cultural logics of that religion. However, they are also important in that their integra-
tion into the individual’s most basic understanding means that they can be used to mobil-
ise individuals to action and self sacrifice for political ends, if those political ends are de-
fined in religious ways10 Not surprisingly, the Islamic idiom in Palestinian nationalism 
10　This is clearly illustrated in the case of Hamas itself. Hamas, of course, defines its goals, 
methods, and itself as an organisation in religious terms. According to its charter, for 
example, “Islam is its system”（Chapter One, Article 1）； “The structure of the Islamic 
Resistance Movement［Hamas］consists of Muslims who gave［sic］their loyalty to Allah”
（Chapter One, Article 3）．“The goal of the Islamic Resistance Movement... is to conquer evil, 
break its will, and annihilate it so that truth may prevail, so that the country may return to 
its rightful place, and so that the call may be broadcast over the Minarets... proclaiming the 
Islamic state”（Chapter Two, Article 10）； “The Islamic Resistance Movement.... gives its 
loyalty to Allah, adopts Islam as a system of life, and works toward raising the banner of 
Allah on every inch of Palestine”（Chapter One, Article 6）．Jihād and martyrdom are central 
to the organisation’s and its adherents’ self ─conceptions. The campaign against Israel is a 
jihād necessary, indeed obligatory, because “the land of Palestine is an Islamic Waqf... upon 
all Muslim generations till the day of Resurrection”（Chapter Three, Article 11） and “When 
an enemy occupies some of the Muslim lands Jihād becomes obligatory for every Muslim. In 
the struggle against the Jewish occupation of Palestine, the banner of Jihād must be raised”
（Chapter Three, Article 15）， and “there is no solution to the Palestinian Problem except 
Jihād”（Chapter Three, Article 13）．Martyrdom is also stressed, for example in Hamas’ 
motto：“Allah is its goal. The messenger is its Leader. The Qur’an is its Constitution. Jihād is 
its methodology, and Death for the sake of Allah is its most coveted desire（Chapter One 
Article 8）．（All the above quotations are taken from the translation appearing in Journal of 
Palestine Studies（1993）．）
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emphasises these categories at the same time as it leaves them ambiguous（Johnson 
1982： 94）．This is happening in Tustas. Two examples will suffice to demonstrate the 
practical importance of religion and terms from the religious idiom in the political rhetoric 
and mobilisation of Muslim Tustasis. These are the use of the idea of martyrdom, and mil-
lenarianist political visions.
Tustasi Muslims use the concept of martyrdom almost wholly in its religious sense. Ex-
pressing views shared by virtually all his fellow Muslims in the village, in discussing the 
unrest and the people’s motivations and actions, Abu Ahmad, a Muslim shopkeeper of 
about forty years of age, said that, “Our faith in God is the source of our strength. It is 
that which allows us to struggle and change the situation. Nationalism is secondary to this. 
It is religion which makes us strong and shall give us victory. Basically we want to die 
more than the Israelis want to live and because of this we shall continue this struggle and 
prevail over them. ” Or, as Ziad, a member of the Muslim Brothers of about thirty years 
of age, said “we want to die. For Muslims, anyone who dies in this struggle to put things 
right is a martyr and will go to heaven. This makes us irresistible and means that our 
cause cannot fail. ” Christians, on the other hand, did not invoke the idea of martyrdom to 
explain why there should be an eventual victory by the Palestinians. They preferred to 
put their faith in political organisation and pressure, arguing that victory would come be-
cause the Palestinian movement was a genuinely popular movement boasting a genuinely 
democratic organisation. Some even went so far as to deride martyrdom as a wholly Mus-
lim idea and a naive and reactionary one at that. They did recognise, however, that it had 
a great and potentially dangerous motivational power precisely because “the Muslims 
want to die and feel that if they fight at the admonition of their religious leaders, struggle 
and death have the sanction of religion, and that if they die they will go to heaven. ”
Among Tustasi Islamists religion is not only used directly to mobilise individuals to partic-
ipate in the political movement through ideas such as martyrdom, but also to prophesy
（and claim）the future. One of the most common ways to do this is to apply millenarianist 
interpretations to verses from the Qur’an. “The Cow”is especially enthusiastically inter-
preted to indicate the inevitable nature of the destruction of the State of Israel and the 
creation of a Muslim State in Palestine. This verse is universally interpreted by Tustasi 
Muslims to mean that it is inevitable that Muslims will succeed in overthrowing the cur-
rent State of Israel and expel the Israelis. The interpretation has strong mobilising power 
and is often made during sermons in the mosque, at public gatherings, and was made by 
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one of the prime Hamas activists in a graveside commentary at the memorial service for 
those killed in the attack by Israeli settlers.
Such a practical importance of religion in the pursuit of political ends for the Muslims is 
not, perhaps, surprising given the often repeated axiom that Islam does not separate poli-
tics from religion. This idea is stated explicitly by the Muslims as distinguishing them 
from Christians and Westerners. It is also stated explicitly by the Christians, who recog-
nise it as a distinctive feature of the Muslims and one which makes co─operation with the 
latter difficult.
By contrast, among the Christians, as we have seen, religion is not important for achieving 
political ends; indeed, it cannot be used because there is a radical separation between the 
two. It is in the Christians’interest to separate politics and religion in order to promote a 
secular nationalism. Only a secular nationalism can guarantee the Christians full rights or 
equal consideration in a future Palestinian state. Religion becomes important politically 
only in so far as they feel themselves threatened by the prospect of religious Muslims 
gaining the upper hand or having excessive influence in such a future state.
For Tustas’s Muslims, in opposition to the secular nationalism of the Christian villagers, 
the use of Islam provides a high degree of group boundary maintenance and solidarity 
based on ideas of religious difference and the themes of unity and fragmentation. It pro-
vides for enhanced group consciousness and solidarity. These features are encapsulated in 
their contrasting characterisation of the Christians as having‘one hundred religions’.
Nationally, the Islamic idiom of the MB─Hamas emphasises moral renewal in the face of a 
claimed failure of secular ideologies and parties to secure national liberation. It therefore 
allows the individual to take up a cause and states that there can be no other way; hence 
its orthodox shape. This is done by linking cosmology, history, the group, and the individu-
al in opposition to encroachment and oppression. This works in the specific conditions of 
Tustas also. There, however, as well as mobilising the Muslims in an orthodox political 
structure for the national struggle it opposes itself to the heterodox and secular mobilisa-
tion evident among the Christians. Among the latter, because of their denominational divi-
sions religion cannot serve the same role even in political mobilisation among themselves.
Thus, in the context of Tustasi Muslims’dispositions, adherence to a single party has ob-
　　19
Understanding the Development of Islamism and Islamic Fundamentalism from a Cultural-Logical 
Perspective：Social and Cultural Developments in a Palestinian Village on the West Bank
vious advantages within the village as a direct expression of unity. There are added ad-
vantages in Hamas being a Muslim organisation. These advantages are oppositional：it ex-
cludes Christians and its very religious rhetoric opposes it to the secular parties supported 
by the Christians. But the arrangement is not simply a Muslim─Christian opposition. Be-
cause of the social─structural features in place it is also an opposition between heterodox 
and orthodox structures or, in other words, those（such as the PLO）which admit the pos-
sibility of alternative ways and methods and those（such as Hamas）which do not.
Orthodoxy only exists in opposition to heterodoxy, and this is a structural aspect of the 
appeal of Hamas to Tustas’s Muslims. Hamas is appealing precisely because by being a 
Muslim organisation it excludes the Christians at the same time as opposing them. This 
opposition is manifested in its constitution as a single and religious political force in con-
trast to the multiplicity of secular groups among the Christians. Thus, in the political are-
na we find replicated the differentiations found in the religious and kin realms. The unity 
of the Muslims（with one religion, ancestor, and political organisation）is opposed to the 
plurality of the Christians（with‘one hundred religions,’diverse ancestry, and several po-
litical organisations）．Radical differences between the political groups supported by the 
Christians are celebrated by them as showing their democratic credentials. A further 
elaboration of this opposition is found in the location of all the‘Christian’forces in the
‘democratic’PLO while Hamas is found outside it（and indeed in real opposition to it）．
Thus, locally there is a potentially complicated articulation of oppositions between Muslim 
and Christian; secular and religious; foreign contamination and Islamic purity; democratic 
pluralism and political singularity; inside the PLO and outside it. That articulation is made 
through an orthodox opposition to heterodoxy. Common to the articulating opposition of 
orthodoxy/heterodoxy and the other, articulated oppositions, however, are the themes of 
unity and fragmentation. These themes indeed are fundamental cultural logics through 
which sense can be made even of seeming anomalies such as local Muslims’complete alle-
giance to Hamas.
While other commentators are surprised at or deny the potential for religious groups to 
assume leadership of the Palestinian national movement, a cultural ─ logical approach is 
more flexible in this matter. The adherence of Tustasi Muslims to Hamas is explicable in 
terms of their disposition to orthodoxy and that disposition is explicable in terms of the 
cultural logics discussed. Other authors have understood, as MB─Hamas activists did 
some long time before, re─socialisation is a key attractor but have not explained in all but 
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the most general terms why this should be so. In Tustas the disposition to orthodoxy ex-
plains the appeal of an organisation concerned with re─socialisation conceived of as a 
cleansing of the people from‘foreign’contamination and to which there are no alterna-
tives. Of course, I am not saying that the same circumstances and dispositions will be rep-
licated across Palestine and Palestinian society, though undeniably perception of Hamas as 
a national opposition to the PLO is strengthened by the former’s very orthodox opposition
（both politically and perceptually）to the disarray, ineffectiveness, corruption, oppressive-
ness and weakness towards Israel of the latter. I hope, however, to have demonstrated the 
feasibility and something of the explanatory utility of the cultural─ logical approach and 
how it, more than text─based criticisms, avoids homogenisation by anchoring discussion to 
individuals and groups. Laborious they may be, but after a generation of work inspired by 
Said’s approach in which any reduction in “Orientalism”has been more than matched by 
the production of “Occidentalism”and the dangers of treating life and society as if they 
were texts rather than texts as products of life and society, it is such subject─centred lo-
cal studies which hold the key to successful “anti─homogenisation”．In addition, this alter-
native approach makes clear that given appropriate circumstances religious groups can in-
deed successfully challenge the secularists in the Palestinian national movement.
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